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CHAPTER3 
POSTCOLONIAL MIGRANTS IN 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Identity Politics versus the Fragmentation of Community 
Gert Oostindie 
Introduction 
Over one million of the 16.4 million citizens of the Netherlands are first-
or second-generation migrants from the former colonies. This paper dis-
cusses the post-war history of these postcolonial migrants. At some points 
comparisons are made with other groups of so-called 'non-Western' mi-
grants. It is appropriate to emphasize beforehand that this analytical divi-
sion between postcolonial and other non-Western migrant communities 
is important for the Netherlands, as it is also for Portugal and perhaps 
Spain, but it seems largely irrelevant to the United Kingdom and France. 
The arrival of non-Western migrants in most other Western European 
states had little to do with their own colonial history. 1 
In the Netherlands, the largest community of postcolonial migrants 
stems from the turbulent decolonization of Indonesia immediately after 
the Second World War. The formation of the Surinamese community in 
the Netherlands is directly linked to the highly contested transfer of sover-
eignty in 1975. The last, still ongoing, chapter in this postcolonial history 
is written by migrants from the (former) Netherlands Antilles, in particu-
lar Cura<;ao (Figure 3.1, Table 3.1). The first two streams of migration 
were directly linked to the transfer of sovereignty, albeit in dissimilar ways. 
The later Antillean migration continues to this day precisely because there 
has been no such change in constitutional status. 
This contribution provides an analysis of the backgrounds, processes 
and consequences of these post-war migrations. The first sections discuss 
Notes for this chapter begin on page 124. 
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the colonial backgrounds of the migrant groups, the nexus between de-
colonization and migration, and the actual processes of migration. There-
after the focus shifts to patterns of integration of these highly divergent 
postcolonial communities in the metropolis and, as a corollary, the ways 
the host society reacted to these migrations and was transformed in the 
process. Particular attention is given to the contests over group and na-
tional identities, and the applicability of the concept of identity politics. 
This type of analysis begs for analytical clarity and broader contextu-
alization. As for the first, in much of what follows there is little theoreti-
cal reflection on the key concepts of 'community' and 'identity'.2 It has 
become a truism that such concepts refer to processes rather than givens, 
a reality obscured by the everyday labelling and self-presentations of indi-
viduals and groups. This point is taken but slightly glossed over in what 
follows. 'Community' is simply used as a common denominator for a 
group of people sharing elements of a prehistory in a former Dutch col-
ony. There is some discussion of common characteristics arising from this 
background. There is no firm assumption that these various communities 
jointly or separately share one identity, or are in the process of forging (or 
forsaking) one such postcolonial identity. Neither is it taken for granted 
that the majority of second and following generations of 'postcolonial 
migrants' think of themselves in such terms at all. 
Mapping Postcolonial Migrations 
Colonial Origins 
On the eve of the Second World War, the Dutch colonial empire con-
sisted of one huge colony, the Indonesian archipelago, and two tiny ones 
in the Caribbean. An enormous demographic disparity characterized this 
empire. While the Netherlands had fewer than nine million inhabitants, 
the population of the Dutch East Indies numbered seventy million. Suri-
name, in spite of its large surface, had no more than 140,000 and the six 
Caribbean islands together a mere 108,000. 
An immense territory and great ethnic heterogeneity defined the Dutch 
East Indies. The Dutch ruled the colony, but made up an insignificant 
proportion of its total population. Colonial rule had institutionalized a 
rigid 'ethnic' classification into three classes. 'Europeans' were either met-
ropolitan or locally born. In contrast to British India, a majority in the 
latter category were of Eurasian origin. The Chinese made up the major-
ity of 'Foreign Orientals' . The overwhelming majority of the population 
was labelled 'Indigenous', a category including local aristocracies as well 
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as the destitute masses throughout the archipelago. Members of the last 
two categories were defined as 'colonial subjects' rather than full citizens 
of the Dutch empire. 3 
Throughout the colonial period, a migration circuit had linked the 
colony to the metropolis. For present purposes, what interests us most 
is not the constant coming and going of metropolitan Europeans, but 
rather the extent to which people actually living in the colony visited 
the metropolis and perhaps settled there. There was a small but steady 
stream of such migrants, mainly middle- and upper-class, locally born, le-
gal 'Europeans', often accompanied by their own servants. The objectives 
of these metropolitan sojourns included the pursuit of higher education, 
furlough, or simply the desire to 'repatriate' to a European country only 
known through family stories. By the turn of the century, The Hague had 
acquired the epithet of 'the widow of the [East] Indies'. Some twenty 
thousand 'Indische Nederlanders' lived there. 4 
With the economic growth of the colony and the intensification of the 
colonial nexus, the numbers of migrants increased and widened. In the 
late colonial period, students from the 'Indigenous' and 'Foreign Oriental' 
elites started to enrol at Dutch universities. Small numbers of lower-class 
Indonesians followed, but throughout the entire period, the character of 
the colonial migrant community was anything but a representative sample 
of the archipelagic population. Totoks - first-generation Dutch settled in 
the colony- andlndische Nederlanders (born in the colony) taken together 
added up to less than l per cent of the population in the colony, but 
dominated the expatriate community in the metropolis. There was thus a 
class as well as an ethnic and cultural bias, as the majority of migrants were 
white or Eurasian, Christian, had a fair command of the Dutch language, 
and had participated in Dutch education or would do so - in short, an 
extremely unrepresentative sample. 
Migration from the Caribbean colonies presents a slightly different 
picture. This contrast starts with the actual settlement in the Americas. 
With the exception of small numbers of Amerindians in Suriname and on 
the island of Aruba, immigrants made up the entire population of these 
Dutch colonies. Europeans formed a minority amongst an overwhelming 
majority of enslaved Mricans and their descendants. After the abolition of 
slavery in 1863, large numbers of indentured labourers from British India 
and Java were transported to Suriname. In contrast to the Dutch East 
Indies, all inhabitants of these colonies would eventually be considered 
full Dutch citizens, and hence have the right of abode in the metropolis. 
Throughout the colonial period, there was a small but steady stream of 
Dutch 'repatriates' to a metropolis some of the migrants had never seen 
before. The motives were much the same: education, furlough, or a corn-
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fortable retirement. During the period of slavery, members of the white 
elites would visit the Netherlands and perhaps settle there, often taking 
their slaves with them. Post-slavery, the composition of the modest Carib-
bean migrant community came to reflect changes in the social fabric of 
these societies. 'Creoles' of mixed descent joined the students enrolled in 
Dutch universities. The first lower-class black migrants followed. But all 
of this was a mere footnote to the exodus that was to follow. 5 
West Indian migrants had much in common with the 'Europeans' 
from the East Indies. They spoke Dutch and had gone through Dutch 
education. Most belonged to the colonial upper and middle classes. They 
enjoyed full citizenship rights in the metropolis. Many of them were of 
mixed origins. And all were creolized to the point that the metropolitan 
population often considered them far less 'Dutch' than they themselves 
thought they were. 
Like their counterparts from the East Indies, the Caribbean migrants 
started various types of associations. Some of these were educational, cul-
tural, or social. Others had explicit political goals, and indeed in the 1930s 
the Netherlands witnessed serious pro-independence agitation by a hand-
ful of left-wing radicals, notably the Indonesians Semaoen, Mohammed 
Hatta and Rostam Effendi, and the Surinamese Anton de Kom. Dutch 
authorities reacted strongly against this flag-waving. Only the Communist 
Party supported the cause of independence, while all major parties, includ-
ing the Social-Democrats, considered a transfer of sovereignty a possibil-
ity for the remote future. 
Decolonization and Migration 
This self-serving naivete was shattered during and immediately after the 
Second World War. 6 
The Netherlands was occupied by the Germans in 1940, while Japan 
took over the Dutch East Indies in 1942. Only the Caribbean territories 
remained 'free', that is, colonial possessions ruled by the government in 
exile. During the war, the London-based Dutch cabinet finally came up 
with proposals for colonial reform, including autonomous rule in the vari-
ous territories. All of this was too little, too late for the major colony. On 
17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese capitulation, Indonesian 
nationalists Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed independence. It 
would take a full four years of bitter warfare and thorny negotiations be-
fore the transfer of sovereignty was accomplished at the end of 1949. New 
Guinea (Papua) was left out of this deal, but to great Dutch resentment it 
would be added to the Republic of Indonesia in 1962. 
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In the lee of this violent and, for all parties, traumatic episode, the first 
phase in the decolonization of the Caribbean was quietly negotiated. By 
the 1954 'Statuut' or Charter of the Kingdom, both Suriname and the 
Netherlands Antilles attained autonomy within the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands. This constitutional status would prevail for Suriname until the 
full transfer of sovereignty in 1975. The Statuut still binds the six islands 
to the Netherlands in an ambivalent postcolonial imbroglio- not that the 
Dutch wanted to retain their former colonies in the Caribbean, but rather 
they found no valid arguments or effective means to impose independence 
on populations who consistently refused the 'gift' of sovereignty. 
These three highly divergent patterns of decolonization in turn marked 
very dissimilar migration histories. During the Japanese occupation of 
the Dutch East Indies, most of the European population had been con-
centrated under horrible circumstances in detention camps, while many 
males had been deployed as forced labourers under even worse condi-
tions. Many 'Europeans' of Eurasian background had not been sent to 
the detention camps, but would find themselves increasingly isolated, and 
were threatened and harassed by both the Japanese and the Indonesian 
population. Thousands of Europeans perished during the war. 
Things were not getting any better for the European citizenry in the 
immediate post-war years, as the armed fight over the country's political 
status became wedded to social and civil struggle, and plain criminality. 
This so-called bersiap period caused the death of thousands of white and 
coloured Europeans. With the transfer of independence, order was more 
or less restored, but the remaining resident European and Eurasian popu-
lation segments felt increasingly marginalized in the new republic which, 
in turn, saw these groups as remnants of a despised racial colonial order. 
The end of the war and the following successive turbulent phases of the 
decolonization process triggered a series of migrations to the metropolis. 7 
The first round consisted mainly of repatriating first-generation Dutch 
families. In the successive rounds, the proportion ofEurasianindische Ned-
erlanders, who had never been in the Netherlands before, increased, while 
in the 1950s Moluccans joined this migration. In addition, several thou-
sand ethnic Chinese settled in the metropolis. The exodus from Indonesia 
was more or less completed by the mid-1960s. By then some 300,000 had 
migrated to the Netherlands. The volume of the postcolonial community 
rooted in Indonesia stands at 519,000 today, with the first-generation mi-
grants now forming a minority of some 40 per cent (Table 3.1). These are 
considerable numbers - but of course of little demographic importance 
to the country they were leaving, which had a population of seventy-five 
million in 1950 and has three times that number today. 
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Figure 3.1. Net immigration from the former Dutch colonies, 1937-2005 
Source: CBS, and Bosma, Terug uit de kolonien, 27. 
Migration from the Dutch Caribbean was not linked to the war, but did 
relate to the decolonization process. 8 At the time of the proclamation of 
the Statuut, not many more than 5,000 Surinamese and Antilleans were 
living in the Netherlands. This figure had grown to 40,000 by 1970. 
Thereafter, the numbers exploded. The Surinamese community has in-
creased to over 330,000 today- as against 475,000 in contemporary Su-
riname itself. The share of second-generation 'Surinamese' is well over 50 
per cent, but declining (Table 3.1). The growth of the Antillean popula-
tion came later. Today, the Antillean community in the metropolis is some 
130,000. Of these, 40 per cent belong to the second-generation (Table 
3.1). The total population of the six islands is about 300,000. 
A turbulent decolonization triggered the migration from Indonesia, 
and the same applies to Suriname. Yet beyond this congruence there are 
more meaningful disparities. The mass departure from Indonesia was a 
matter of minority groups directly connected to the waning colonial or-
der. The Surinamese exodus, in contrast, consisted of a fairly representa-
tive sample of the total population and was sparked by the Surinamese 
government's highly contested decision to attain independence by the end 
of 1975. While the Dutch government was delighted to comply - partly 
in the hopes of curtailing migration - a large number of the Surinamese 
voted with their feet. 
In the next decades, the spectre of the Surinamese exodus would haunt 
not only the young republic, but equally the former metropolis. The vain 
hope of the Dutch government of enticing the Antillean population and 
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Table 3.1. Postcolonial and other major non-Western migrant communities in the 
Netherlands, 1960-2008 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006/8 (d) 
Total populationt 11.4 13.0 14.1 14.9 15.9 16.4 
million million million million million million 
'Indische 519,000* 
Nederlanders', 
total 
1st generation 204,000 
2nd generation 315,000 
Moluccans, total 25,900 (a) 35,200 (a) 58,349 
1st generation 26,000 
2nd generation 32,349 
Surinamese, total 8,000 28,985 157,091 232,776 302,514 331,900 
(b) (b) 
1st generation 126,107 158,772 183,249 187,483 
2nd generation 30,974 74,004 119,265 144,417 
Antilleans**, ea. 2,500 13,630 40,726 76,552 107,197 129,683 
total (b) (b) 
1st generation 29,515 54,881 69,266 80,102 
2nd generation 11,211 21,671 37,931 49,581 
Moroccans, total ea. lOO (c) 17,400 (c) 69,464 163,458 262,221 335,127 
1st generation 57,502 112,562 152,540 167,063 
2nd generation 11,962 50,896 109,681 168,064 
Turks, total ea. lOO (c) 23,600 (c) 112,774 203,647 308,890 372,714 
lst generation 92,568 138,089 177,754 194,556 
2nd generation 20,206 65,558 131,136 178,158 
t Sex ratios for the total population were balanced throughout this period. The same 
applies to the Indische Nederlanders, Moluccans, Surinamese (since 1970) and Antille-
ans (since 1970). Strong male preponderance characterized the Moroccan and Turkish 
population up to 1990 and 1980 respectively; hereafter, this imbalance was offset. 
* For alternatives figures, see Beets et al., De demografische geschiedenis. 
** From all six islands of the (former) Netherlands Antilles; the great majority from 
Curasao. 
CBS figures for 2006. 
Source: All figures taken from Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS), unless indi-
cated otherwise: 
a. Penninx, Schoorl and Van Praag, The Impact. 
b. Oostindie and Klinkers, Knellende koninkrijksbanden II, 225. 
c. Commissie-Blok, Bruggen bouwen. 
d. Bosma, Terug uit de kolonien, 30 (postcolonial migrants, 2006), CBS (total, 2008; 
Moroccans and Turks, 2008). 
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its leadership to accept independence became increasingly linked to the 
equally futile wish to curtail Antillean migration to the Netherlands. The 
opposite transpired. The choice against independence made by the Antil-
leans has not simply confirmed their citizenship in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and their right of abode in the metropolis. These privileges 
are now key arguments for Antilleans to reject a transfer of sovereignty. 
In sum, decolonization was pivotal for the formation of postcolonial mi-
grant communities in the Netherlands, but the contrasts are enormous. Mi-
gration from the Dutch East Indies mainly involved minority groups linked 
to the colonial system that irrevocably lost their way of living because of a re-
sented transfer of sovereignty. The choice for independence in Suriname trig-
gered an exodus of a fairly representative sample of the total population and 
heavily affected the feasibility of the young republic. The Antillean refusal to 
accept independence not only precludes Dutch yearning to stop Antillean 
migration, it also reflects the islanders' determination to retain all rights at-
tached to citizenship in the Kingdom, particularly the right of abode. 
Profiles: Migrants from the Dutch East Indiesjindonesia 
The notion of a 'postcolonial migrant community' is an adequate pointer 
to differentiate the various groups subsumed under this heading from other 
migrant communities. There is a shared history of Dutch colonialism, a 
measure of pre-migration experience and perhaps affinity with the Dutch 
language and culture, and prior to independence, in most cases, undisputed 
Dutch citizenship and the unrestricted right of abode. One question then is 
how these commonalities affected self-understanding, outside perceptions, 
and paths of integration within this broadly defined 'community'. 
But first we need to address the obvious fact that this common de-
nominator conceals a great deal of diversity within this presumed commu-
nity, and even within the three colonial communities. We simply cannot 
understand postcolonial migration history without taking these contrasts 
seriously. But we also need to ponder other factors, particularly the conse-
quences of the distinct timing of the three migrations. 
In keeping with chronology, we first return to the migrants from In-
donesia. This migration was demographically insignificant to the sending 
country, and represented anything but a cross-section of its population. 
The great majority of the migrants were totoks or Eurasian Indische Ned-
erlanders. Numerically smaller groups included some twelve thousand 
former colonial Moluccan soldiers with their families and about seven 
' thousand ethnic Chinese rooted in Indonesia. 
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Pre-migration socioeconomic and cultural characteristics had evident 
ethnic correlations. Generally speaking, the totoks had occupied the higher 
strata of colonial society and had been relatively successful in securing 
some sort of continuity with Dutch ways in the tropics. A majority in this 
group were strongly affected by the shock of the Japanese camps and the 
bersiap period, and deeply resented the transfer of sovereignty, the loss of 
private property and perhaps kin. Back in the Netherlands, they also have 
suffered status decline. Yet leaving aside personal trauma, these repatriates 
with their high levels of education, social and cultural capital, and white 
skins were certainly the best positioned of all postcolonial migrants to 
start a new life in the metropolis. 
On the eve of their exodus to the Netherlands, the Eurasian Indische 
Nederlanders formed a more differentiated and ambivalent community. 
From the early days of Dutch colonization up to the mid-nineteenth 
century, this Eurasian group had developed its own creolized culture. Its 
socioeconomic profile was highly differentiated, with only a minority un-
disputedly prosperous and well educated. After the First World War, the 
Indische Nederlanders did compete with the metropolitan Dutch, actually 
with success, but on the other hand they faced increasing competition 
themselves from the emerging educated Indonesian middle class. A mea-
sure of anxiety, status insecurity and resentment therefore characterized 
the community long before 1942. Nevertheless, and in spite of the havoc 
created by war and bersiap, many of this group would have opted to re-
main in their homeland had it not been for the new republic's growing 
impatience with this group, which was perceived as colonial. 
Ultimately, over 90 per cent of those with Dutch citizenship left Indo-
nesia, most settling in the Netherlands, but some fifty thousand moving 
on to the United States and other predominantly 'white' non-European 
destinations. The pre-migration profile of the Indische community settling 
in the metropolis was mixed. While they had shared an in-between co-
lonial status, mixed racial descent and Christianity, there were wide dis-
parities in socioeconomic position and educational careers, affinity with 
Dutch culture, and command of the Dutch language. The unsought-for 
parting with Indonesia was traumatic and initially caused a decline in sta-
tus for all. The prospects for them in the white metropolis were therefore 
not particularly good at the start. 
Of the two minorities mentioned above, the Chinese from Indonesia 
underline that socioeconomic performance rather than racial characteris-
tics determine the qualification of 'invisible migrants'. 9 Throughout the 
colonial period, and of course before that, Indonesia had had a Chinese 
population of several millions. Categorized among the 'Foreign Orientals', 
these peranakan (domestic) Chinese were disproportionately represented 
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in the middle and upper socioeconomic layers of the colonial state. Most 
ethnic Chinese would stay in Indonesia after 1945. The minority migrat-
ing to the Netherlands were overwhelmingly middle class, well educated, 
Christian, and Dutch speaking - in short, well equipped. Apparently their 
pre-war status as 'Foreign Orientals' did not preclude their early attain-
ment of full Dutch citizenship. 
In contrast, the majority of the twelve thousand 'Ambonese' or Moluc-
cans arriving in the Netherlands in the early 1950s had a pre-war history of 
modest socioeconomic status and education. 10 Male service in the colonial 
army and their Christian faith had set them apart from the overwhelming 
majority of the 'Indigenous' population. Their previous commitment to 
colonial rule and particularly their ongoing support for Moluccan sepa-
ratism made them unacceptable to the new Indonesian regime. The men 
came to the Netherlands with their families under military orders but sub-
sequently lost their military status. What was left was an ethnic minority 
group with a shared tradition of commitment to colonial rule and strong 
affinity with the Christian monarchy, but overall low pre-migration edu-
cational levels, little command of the Dutch language, an undefined legal 
status, and a strong affinity with the programme of political separatism in 
the Moluccas. These were poor qualifications for successful integration. 
Profiles: Migrants from Suriname 
In the 1970s, migration from Suriname attained the proportions of an ex-
odus. Most of the natural demographic growth of the Surinamese 'nation' 
was in the Netherlands, with at present something of a 60/40 division 
of the total Surinamese population. Pre-independence Suriname was a 
quintessential plural society, with a population divided along ethnic lines. 
In the 1970s, Surinamese of Mrican descent still slightly outnumbered 
their compatriots of Asian descent. By that time, the majority of Mro-
Surinamese were urban carriers of the creolized culture which had been 
pioneered by enslaved Mricans. 11 Middle- and upper-class educational, 
cultural and religious orientations were explicitly Dutch, while lower-class 
orientations were of a more mixed character. 
The population with Asian backgrounds is more heterogeneous. Be-
tween the 1870s and the Second World War, indentured labourers were 
recruited from British India and Java. Their subsequent history testified 
to the desire of these groups to retain distinct identities. The degree of 
exogamy has been limited and Asian Surinamese still classify themselves 
primarily as either Hindustani or Javanese. Within the former population, 
the majority are Hindu, and perhaps 15 per cent Muslim. Islam remains 
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the dominant religion among the Javanese. Christianity is a minority reli-
gion among the Surinamese of Asian origins.12 
Colonial rule did not attempt to do away with the ethnic segmenta-
cion it had produced. Religious and cultural difference was respected, as 
was the private usage of various ethnic languages. But in contrast to the 
strategy in Indonesia, government policies in Suriname made Dutch edu-
cation the norm for all, and Dutch the language for administration. Up-
per- and middle-class Surinamese of all ethnicities came to share a strong 
orientation towards the metropolis and were well versed in Dutch. The 
picture was more ambiguous among the lower-class majorities of all eth-
nicities, but by the 1970s the majority of Surinamese had a reasonable 
command of this language. 
The exodus of the 1970s involved, more or less, a cross-section of the 
sending community, with a slight Asian overrepresentation. 'Racially', all 
Surinamese differed from the Dutch. In culture and religion, the Mro-Su-
rinamese were closer to Dutch culture than the Hindustani- or Javanese-
Surinamese. But divisions of class and hence educational and linguistic 
skills cut across such 'ethnic' lines and would ultimately prove to be of 
more importance in the integration process. 
Profiles: Migrants from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 
The 1954 Statuut endowed autonomy to a six-island country, the Nether-
lands Antilles, with its seat of government on the largest island, Cura<;ao. 
The major constitutional change in the following half century has not 
been the step towards full independence, but rather the disintegration of 
the six-island country. The second-largest island, Aruba, attained separate 
status in 1986, while the dismantlement of the Antilles-of-Five was com-
pleted in October 2010. 13 
Migration to the Netherlands has been a predominantly Cura<;aoan af-
fair, with Aruba following at quite a distance. About 132,000 Antilleans 
and Arubans live in the Netherlands as against less than 300,000 on the 
six islands, hence roughly 30/70. The distribution of the Cura<;aoan trans-
national population is even in the order of 45/55. The Antillean exodus 
is the most recent of the postcolonial migrations under review here. It is 
analytically also the most straightforward. All Antilleans can enjoy full 
citizenship and the right of abode in the Netherlands. One con equence 
of this constitutional arrangement has been a high incidence of circular 
migration. The Antillean migrant community in the Netherlands came to 
represent a cross-section of the Cura<;aoan population and included more 
limited sections of the other islands.14 
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Throughout the post-war period, the overwhelming majority of the 
Antillean community in the Netherlands has been of Mrican descent, 
Christian, and Papiamentu-speaking. Initially, the migrants were mainly 
middle class, seeking higher education and so on. Their educational lev-
els were above average and their command of Dutch was good. From 
the 1980s, the growing Antillean community came to represent a cross-
section of the sending islands, and in particular of Curac;ao. This meant 
a dramatic change in the socioeconomic profile of new arrivals from the 
Antilles. Middle-class migrants continued arriving, but they were now far 
outnumbered by lower-class islanders with meagre educational skills, a 
poor command of Dutch, and little affinity with Dutch culture in general. 
This last episode in the history of postcolonial migration to the Nether-
lands therefore presents a glaring contrast with the opening chapter writ-
ten by Indische Nederlanders. 
Social Mobility and Integration 
Faced with the prospect of relatively massive movements of people from 
the former colonies to the metropolis, Dutch policy makers agonized over 
the chances of the new arrivals and their willingness and ability to adjust 
to Dutch society. They moreover worried about possible hostile reactions 
in the host society, and pondered over ways to curtail free immigration 
from the former colonies. Was there really that much reason to worry? 
There is no unequivocal answer to this question. A first analysis of major 
indicators of socioeconomic status and mobility however does suggest 
that initial appraisals were too pessimistic for immigrants from both In-
donesia and Suriname - perhaps more time needs to pass before we can 
seriously evaluate the current pessimism about the Antillean lower classes. 
In chronological order, the first large groups to arrive were repatriating 
totoks followed by Indische Nederlanders. While the repatriation of the first 
group had not evoked much concern, there had been widespread anxi-
ety that the second group, being firmly rooted in Indonesia, would not 
be capable of integrating in Dutch society. This in turn provoked debate 
about the possibilities of curtailing migration, but to no avail. A concerted 
effort was made to help the adjustment process. Government at all levels, 
churches, and private institutions built a paternalist but rather effective 
machinery to provide temporary housing and to help the integration in 
the educational system and the labour market. 
Studying this integration process in the late 1960s, British sociologist 
Christopher Bagley spoke of a success story in race relations. 15 Perhaps 
this achievement owed more to the pre-migration social and cultural capi-
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tal and post-migration stamina of the Indische Nederlanders than to Dutch 
policy. Either way, this first round of assimilation of 'alien' Dutch citizens 
was remarkable by any standard. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this 
is that we cannot present any serious longitudinal data on integration. By 
the late 1970s, at the time the Dutch government and academia started 
to monitor its minorities, not only the totoks but equally the Indische Ned-
erlanders were considered successfully integrated and therefore no longer 
of interest for policy purposes. Not surprisingly, the same applies to the 
Chinese with Indonesian roots. 16 
The Moluccan community in contrast did figure as a major concern 
when policies for Dutch minorities were being formulated in the late 
1970s. By then, the Surinamese exodus was taking shape and the signals 
that the Mediterranean 'guest labourers' would not repatriate but rather 
bring their kin over became clear. In the following decades, the emer-
gence of a multicultural society would induce the government to develop 
a sophisticated system for monitoring minorities. By the 1980s, the Suri-
namese, Turks and Moroccans were the three largest migrant communities 
and, from the 1990s on, they were increasingly the subject of comparative 
studies. The Antilleans were soon added to the list (Table 3.1). 
Still it would be an awareness of the continual crisis of the Moluc-
can minority that stimulated the first formulation of a Dutch minorities' 
policy. The immediate trigger would be political violence committed by 
second-generation Moluccan youth. It soon transpired that a tragic mix of 
geographical segregation, deficient educational and linguistic skills, politi-
cal resentment, and inadequate policies had produced serious integration 
problems. Concerted effort resulted in gradual improvement, but over half 
a century after arrival and well into the third generation, contemporary 
statistics for the Moluccan minority continue to disclose serious problems. 
Overall statistics for the Surinamese testify to significant progress 
since the 1970s, to the point that many politicians, spokespeople for the 
community, and expert scholars claim, somewhat prematurely, that this 
community's integration is nearly successfully completed. The aggregate 
figures indeed inspire cautious optimism, but with qualifications. There is 
little hard data to differentiate between the situations of the various ethnic 
groups, so we cannot know whether progress is evenly spread. Moreover, 
there are indications that increasing socioeconomic differentiation has 
meant the transmutation of a particular Mro-Surinamese culture of pov-
erty into new metropolitan patterns of deprivation and deviance. 
Up to the 1970s, migration from the Antilles had a middle-class bias 
and tended to be for educational purposes and, therefore, temporary. 
While this strand of migration continues up to the present and causes no 
problems, the situation of a disproportionate number of the contempo-
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rary Antilleans, predominantly the Cura<_;:aoan community, is considered 
worrisome, whether one looks at education, income and the labour mar-
ket, family stability, or criminality. Three explanatory factors should be 
singled out. First, there is a direct continuity here: the exodus has involved 
a cross-section of an insular population characterized by the same grave 
problems. Next, the widespread deficiency with regard to command of the 
Dutch language has hampered upward social mobility on the island and 
has become an impediment to subsequent integration in the metropolis. 
Finally, unlike the migrations above, Antillean migration remains an on-
going and circular process. This means that room for an effective interven-
tion has been limited. 
Of course, integration is not only about hard issues such as income, 
labour market participation, educational achievement, health, deviance 
and the like, but also about participation in society outside of one's own 
community - to the point that it may become less self-evident to define 
these 'communities' by 'ethnic' criteria at all. In this respect, the postco-
lonial migrant communities have come to differ from the other major 
migrant groups. The most telling indication of this is the high frequency 
of interracial relations and offspring for Indische Nederlanders, Moluccans 
and Indonesian Chinese, as well as for Mro-Surinamese and Antilleans. 
The figures are much lower for Hindustani and Javanese from Suriname. 
At this point it is useful to provide some comparative figures. Unem-
ployment is a good place to good start (Table 3.2). After a dramatic peak 
in the early 1980s, national unemployment figures decreased well into 
the twenty-first century. Unemployment for the major non-Western mi-
grant communities likewise decreased spectacularly, but remained clearly 
above the overall national figure. In 2006, with the exception of the Antil-
lean community, first-generation unemployment was lower than second-
generation figures for these communities. The initial considerable edge 
the Surinamese and Antilleans had over Moroccans and Turks, however, 
seems to be slowly fading. Net labour participation since the late 1980s 
discloses a similar trend for all migrant communities. Their rates may im-
prove but are still behind the equally improved overall Dutch figures. For 
participation rates we do see a consistent advantage for Surinamese and to 
a lesser extent Antilleans over Moroccans and Turks. 17 
According to Dutch national statistics for 2006, average household 
incomes in the four major migrant communities still lagged behind the 
national averages, with the Surinamese at the high end ( 82 per cent of 
the national average), followed by the Turks (71 ), Moroccans (68) and 
Antilleans (63). The low figure for Antillean households may partly be ex-
plained by the high incidence of single-parent, female-headed households; 
the same probably applies to the Mro-Surinamese community. 18 
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Table 3.2. Unemployment figures (per cent), postcolonial and other major 
non-Western migrant communities in the Netherlands, 1981-2006 
1981 1983 1988 1991 1998 2002 2006 
Total 8 14 7.7 5.9 4.1 2.2 3.3 
Moluccans 41 
Surinamese 35-40 33 26 13 10 12 
Antilleans 43 35 31 15 12 17 
Moroccans 21 37 38 36 23 14 17 
Turks 21 34 38 31 21 14 15 
Sources: CBS for totals. Dagevos, Perspectief op integratie, for 1981, 1983. Veenman, 
De arbeidsmarktpositie, for 1988. Veenman, 'De maatschappelijke positie', for 1998. 
Dagevos, Gijsberts and Van Praag, Rapportage minderheden 2003, for 2002. Dagevos 
and Gijsberts,]aarrapportintegratie 2007, for 2006. CBS for totals 1991,2002, 2006. 
Long-term figures for educational achievement are hard to come by, 
but the data we have do allow for some conclusions.19 There is a gradual 
improvement for all migrant communities. This is particularly evident for 
Moroccans and Turks, whose second generations, not surprisingly, do much 
better than the poorly educated first generation. Ever since this type of mon-
itoring started in the 1980s, the Surinamese and Antillean communities have 
had a clear edge over the Mediterranean migrants. Today their overall educa-
tional profiles are still superior, even if still below the Dutch average. 
While there is some ground to assume that the Dutch system worked 
reasonably well in helping the second generation to higher educational 
levels than the first one, there is still a considerable gap compared with the 
local white population. With the steady increase in the proportion of non-
Western populations in all major cities and the ensuing emergence of'black 
schools' over the past decade, there is much concern about whether the 
educational system can continue to help to bridge the gap. There is some 
historical evidence against too much optimism and laissez-faire here. In 
the 1980s, research on the relatively small Moluccan community pointed 
to the failure of regular education to significantly raise the educational 
achievement of second- and third-generation Moluccans. It took consider-
able extra investments in the 1990s to, at least partly, redress this situation. 
To the extent that the Dutch educational system does facilitate better 
educational performance and thus, we may assume, stimulate successful 
integration, the second and later generations of the postcolonial com-
mw1ities face the prospects of declining competitive advantages over the 
Mediterranean migrant communitie . By the second and certainly the 
third generation, citizenship issues are no longer relevant, the educational 
system works more or less the same for all, and the advantage of the 
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first postcolonial generations' prior knowledge of Dutch society and corn-
mand of the Dutch language diminishes. From this perspective, we may 
well understand why spokespeople from the Moluccan and, particularly, 
Caribbean communities voice concern over the narrowing of the debate 
on minorities to the integration of Moroccans and Turks, as if postcolonial 
migrants' integration had been successfully completed by now. 
Figures on delinquency provide a sad indication that successful integra-
tion has not been achieved. The arrival of migrants in the Netherlands as 
elsewhere has always been accompanied by unsubstantiated stories of crime 
and other deviant behaviour. While we should be extremely cautious about 
such often xenophobic reports, recent figures for all migrant communities 
confirm higher crime rates. Moreover, the postcolonial bonus does not seem 
relevant here, as Antilleans champion some of the wrong statistics, followed 
in this precise order by Moroccans, Surinamese and Turks.20 
On the scale of interethnic relations, postcolonial migrants are defi-
nitely more integrated. Why the incidence of interracial relations would 
be higher for postcolonial migrants is not hard to surmise. No matter 
what 'racial' and political differences there may be, there were pre-migra-
tion affinities in education, culture, and, for most groups, religion. The 
latter also most likely explains why Hindustani and Javanese integration 
stopped at that point. Nevertheless the contrasts with all other major mi-
grant communities are significant. The majority of the latter are Muslim 
and - unlike in France - adhere to an interpretation of the Koran that 
interracial marriage may be good, but interreligious marriage is unaccept-
able. Moreover, choice of marriage partners tends to be along national 
lines. Both Moroccans and Turks have strong national orientations and are 
reinforced in this by 'home' authorities. Average command of the Dutch 
language is less accomplished than among postcolonial migrants and its 
usage in private is more limited. These factors combined are not condu-
cive to interethnic mixing. 
This brief glance at some relevant statistics therefore confirms that in 
spite of overall improvement, Moroccan and Turkish integration so far 
lags behind the averages for the majority of postcolonial migrants - not 
even counting the Indische Nederlanders who no longer figure in any of 
these listings. Coupled to post-9 /11 apprehensions about a Muslim 'fifth 
column' unwilling and unable to integrate, this had a slightly perverse 
effect on the status of postcolonial migrants in the Netherlands, making 
them a more preferable - or perhaps less resented - type of immigrant, 
and was 'proof' that the problem lies not with the host society.21 
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Political Opportunity Structures 
Did the post-war Netherlands really provide such good opportunities? 
Answering this may lead on to the question of how racist or xenophobic 
Dutch society has or has not been, between 1945 and today. It is not the 
objective of this contribution even to begin to answer this exceedingly 
complex and perhaps embarrassing question. Suffice it to say that Bagley's 
praise for Dutch success in dealing with migration and race relations was 
open to criticism in 1970, a fortiori so once the mass migrations from the 
Caribbean and the Mediterranean gained momentum, and certainly with 
the rise of anti-migrant populism in the new millennium. While open 
racism was and remains unacceptable in most spheres of Dutch society, 
toleration of immigrants has oscillated strongly over time - but it seems 
not to have significantly affected the integration trajectories of postcolo-
nial migrant communities. 
Any discussion of the vicissitudes of Dutch toleration should take the 
broader context seriously. In 1945, the Netherlands was a white country 
with a long but not very recent history of mainly northern European im-
migration. In the 1950s, the idea that the small country could no longer 
provide opportunities for all of its inhabitants resulted in state-sponsored 
emigration to countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
South Mrica. Some three hundred thousand Dutch left. In these circum-
stances, it is no surprise that the arrival of many more immigrants, a ma-
jority of non-Western origin, has gone down in history as a rupture. 
Today, amongst a population of 16.4 million, there are over 1 million 
with roots in the colonies, nearly 1 million from Muslim countries, mainly 
from North Mrica and Turkey, and another 750,000 'Western' migrants. 
The total proportion of first- and second-generation immigrants is just 
below 20 per cent. Of the total immigration population, 45 per cent is 
classified as Western and 55 per cent as non-Western. Within the larger cit-
ies, all proportions for immigrants are above the national average. In Am-
sterdam and Rotterdam, first- and second-generation immigrants form 
a majority of the population, and many lower-class neighbourhoods are 
now predominantly non-white. 
These demographic changes have caused serious tensions, but arguably 
strong political articulation dates only from the late 1990s. Before that, 
mainstream politics maintained a low profile on migration issues. Most 
politicians advocated an inclusionary policy, certainly for the postcolo-
nial migrants. This applied first to issues of citizenship. There is a para-
dox here. Recent studies demonstrate that, like their rank and file, many 
politicians were questioning whether previous colonial citizenship should 
translate into the right of abode in the metropolis. 22 Thus there were seri-
112 Gert Oostindie 
ous debates about withholding such rights from the Indische Nederlanders 
and Moluccans, who were supposedly 'rooted' in Indonesia and therefore 
not able to re-root in the Netherlands. Next, in the debate over a transfer 
of sovereignty to the former Caribbean colonies, the need to stop migra-
tion by withdrawing citizenship was a serious argument for Dutch politi-
cians. Mter Antillean independence had proved to be a Dutch illusion, 
mainstream politicians advocated the curtailment of the right of abode. 
A series of confidential commissions explored ways to restrict migra-
tion from the overseas territories. The paradox in all of this was that most 
politicians, and all successive governments, no matter their reluctance, 
and even though fully aware that a good part of the electorate advocated 
the closing of the borders to migrants from the former colonies, ended up 
publicly defending the citizenship rights of overseas citizens. Hence no 
legal restraints were imposed on the 'repatriates' from Indonesia, nor on 
the Surinamese, until five years after independence, and, up to the present, 
there are none on the Antilleans. Moreover, the defence of this unpopular 
stance implied solemn and dramatic admonitions not to forget that the 
Dutch shared a long history with these new immigrants. Prime Minister 
Willem Drees declared publicly in 1953, in spite of his personal scepti-
cism about the prospects of Indische Nederlanders, that there was a 'special 
responsibility', and even a 'duty', to welcome this group with a 'right' to 
a place in 'our society'.23 
Such public statements discredited critics of unrestricted access as un-
reasonable. The same public rhetoric would be deployed to counter pro-
tests against the growing migration from Suriname, even if members of 
cabinet actually shared the misgivings expressed in the media. It is ironic 
that only in the past few years have members of the government and par-
liament alike been less reticent vis-a-vis Antillean migration, hence from 
the Antillean perspective eroding the fundamentals of the 1954 Statuut 
with its solemn words about shared and equivalent citizenship. 
As it is, the citizenship of the postcolonial migrants implied full access 
to all state provisions, from education and housing through health ser-
vices to unemployment and seniority allowances. There were few political 
debates about limiting access to such provisions. At the time of the mass 
migration from Indonesia, the overall level of such provisions was very 
modest anyway. The Dutch economy was in a shambles after the war and 
it took another twenty years before the 'Dutch miracle' permitted the es-
tablishment of a generous system of public provisions, later regarded as a 
symptom of the 'Dutch disease'. 
So what type of policy did the Dutch government enact? The main 
support was help with finding temporary housing, followed by guidance 
about coping with Dutch ways, to facilitate integration. This is often re-
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garded as paternalistic if not condescending. Direct financial assistance 
was meagre. There was clearly much bitterness expressed in Indische re-
membrances when collected years later. But as a recent study suggests, the 
level of material support was not negligible by the standards of the time. 
Perhaps the lack of empathy left more of an enduring resentment. 24 As it 
was, the spectacular post-war economic growth soon provided room for 
substantial progress. 
By the time of the exodus from Suriname, the Dutch welfare state was 
at its zenith. Inevitably the sudden arrival of so many migrants with full 
Dutch citizenship placed a heavy burden on housing and welfare provi-
sions. The good thing about this was that the settling of the Surinamese 
population occurred without major crises. The bad thing was that there 
was a disproportionate dependence of Surinamese migrants on state pro-
visions. This was not getting better as the Dutch economy entered into 
a crisis with staggering rates of unemployment in the early 1980s. Only 
the new round of economic growth in the 1990s enabled the Surinamese 
community to attain significant socioeconomic progress. 
Again, the case of the Antillean community is paradoxical. The Cu-
ras:aoan exodus dates from the 1990s, precisely a period of impressive 
economic growth. Yet while the Surinamese community did manage to 
benefit from this bonanza, the Antilleans did not and hence remain far 
more dependent on welfare. This may be explained by the socioeconomic 
profile of the community which was mainly lower class and generally 
lacked the appropriate linguistic and educational skills. Related to this, 
female-headed households with young children came to dominate Cu-
ras:aoan migration in the 1990s. What followed was a 'welfare trap' and 
levels of deviance among youngsters unparalleled in the history of postco-
lonial migration to the Netherlands. 
In reviewing the socioeconomic development of the various communi-
ties one cannot escape the conclusion that government was crucial in re-
straining overt racism and in securing the right of abode and unrestricted 
access to citizenship rights such as education, the labour market, and 
welfare provisions. Only the latter proved a mixed blessing. Government 
policies aiming at - or forsaking - cultural assimilation will be discussed 
below. One may debate whether these had any consequence whatsoever 
in the socioeconomic arena. 
Historians of migration tend to have a rosier picture of migration than 
sociologists and political scientists.25 While scholar from the social ci-
ences tend to focus on 'new' contemporary problems, historian follow-
ing their interest in long-term trends, often feel that succes ful integration 
is simply a matter of time. Three generations, migration historians often 
affirm, is the more reliable time-span to evaluate whether integration is 
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successful or at least well underway. Departing from that principle, we 
can only evaluate the migration from Indonesia - concluding, of course, 
that the totok, Indische and Chinese stories are all successful, the Moluccan 
record mixed. The first three communities made good use of their postco-
lonial social and cultural capital as well as the post-war Dutch economic 
miracle. The question is why the last group failed to do so. 
What of the Caribbean migration, with its shorter time lapse? Well 
over thirty years after the initial exodus, the Surinamese community seems 
on the right track, but there are two caveats here. We do not have good 
longitudinal surveys to differentiate between the various ethnic groups. 
Secondly, the fact that the Surinamese are doing better than most other 
migrant communities does not mean they are on a par with the rest of 
society - and there is no reason not to deploy that yardstick. Still the 
conclusion is warranted that the Surinamese community did benefit from 
the postcolonial bonus, that is, undisputed citizenship and a fairly good 
knowledge of, and some degree of affinity with, the Dutch language and 
culture. The Hindustani case shows that a religious match with the Chris-
tian traditions of the metropolis per se is not a significant factor. 
The crisis in the Antillean community- again, not including its middle 
class- seems deeper than any previous one among the postcolonial mi-
grants, except for the Moluccans. Of course, the time elapsed is shorter 
here. Yet as with the Moluccan community, the postcolonial bonus appar-
ently was less active. This may seem surprising. Both groups are Christian 
and their middle-class segments have a long history of strong and cordial 
relations with metropolitan policy makers, spiritual leaders and the like. 
There is a strong tradition of interracial relations. But in both cases, prior 
command of the Dutch language and educational skills were poor. Both 
groups moreover have nurtured political resentment over colonialism and 
its legacies. Finally both communities have tended towards self-isolation, 
in the Moluccan case initially supported by Dutch policy, in the Antillean 
case in spite of vain governmental efforts to accomplish the opposite. 
A political opportunity structure is partly determined by the way politi-
cians, opinion leaders and the like debate issues in public. Arguably the 
historical nexus worked well here, certainly favouring postcolonial mi-
grants over other immigrant communities. As with the debate over the 
right of abode, opinion leaders have tended to emphasize long-standing 
relations, historical responsibilities, and the like. The one exception to this 
rule is of recent date. With the general hardening of the public debate 
over migration issues, the cases of the Indische Nederlanders, and at times 
also the Surinamese, are still quoted as proof that flexible, hard-working 
migrants will be allowed to find their place in society, but the Antillean 
youth are increasingly excluded from this benign discourse. 
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In politics, and other sectors of public life such as the mass media, 
postcolonial migrants were the first among the post-war immigrants to 
make it to positions of responsibility and visibility- again the cultural and 
social capital of the postcolonial nexus paid off. The first generation of 
immigrant members of parliament and municipal councils was dominated 
by members of the postcolonial communities, as were the first non-white 
faces on television. The same applied to sports, although it was precisely 
in the most popular of all sports, soccer, where the rise of black protago-
nists caused some of the most virulent debates about the complexities of 
racial relations in Dutch society. 
Either way, we may safely conclude that in the public arena, white is no 
longer the norm. Perhaps more telling is another observation. Over the 
past decades Indische Nederlanders have been less conspicuous in politics 
and the media than people of Caribbean origin - apparently the need 
to 'present' the former is no longer seen as urgent. Successful integra-
tion thus has contradictory effects. And indeed recently there have been 
complaints from the Caribbean community that their representatives and 
concerns are increasingly neglected, as the focus has now shifted to the 
symbolic inclusion of the Muslim communities. 
Degrees of and Varieties in Multiculturalism 
In the mid-l970s, radical Moluccan youths organized a series of violent ac-
tions to protest about what they, following their parents, thought of as the 
'colonial occupation' of the Moluccas by Indonesia. They blamed the Dutch 
government for its lack of support for an independent Moluccan republic, 
and for its betrayal of their fathers who had been demobilized against their 
will in the metropolis. Linked to this political anger was deep frustration 
over the lack of progress the community had made in the Netherlands. 
Political violence was unheard of in the tranquil post-war Netherlands. 
Train hijackings, and occupations of the Indonesian embassy and a pri-
mary school were met by military counteractions and left several casual-
ties. From this bloody episode, coinciding with the exodus from Suriname 
and the permanent settlement and family reunion of many of the labour 
migrants from the Mediterranean, emerged the conviction that the time 
had come to formulate a minority policy. In 1979, the Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (WRR) published the first report explicitly stating 
that most immigrants from the former colonies and the Mediterranean 
had come to stay, and that their settlement required specific policies. The 
government accepted the argument - but it would take ten years, the 
influx of several hundred thousand new immigrants, and a second WRR 
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report before it was officially recognized that the Netherlands had indeed 
become an immigrant country. 26 
Much has been made in the past decade of the supposed failure of Dutch 
minority policies. In 2002, the Dutch parliament installed a commission 
to investigate 'what went wrong'. The report published two years later 
by parliamentarians of diverse political leanings and ethnic backgrounds 
offered nuanced conclusions. Yes, migration had changed the Netherlands 
fundamentally and permanently. Yes, there were serious problems with 
several ethnic communities, but there was also progress in all groups. And 
no, there was no reason to state that overall, minority policies had failed 
or that there had been a dear alternative. 27 
By the early twenty-first century, the hardening debate over ethnic 
minorities had become part and parcel of a larger debate about Dutch 
identity. Multiculturalism was attacked as a silly idea of leftist politicians 
forsaking the justified desire of the silent white majorities to preserve a 
national Leitkultur. Much more may be said about this, but for present 
purposes the question is whether Dutch politics had indeed moved to 
reckless multiculturalism since the 1970s, allowing for mass immigration, 
neglecting the labour market and educational issues, pampering migrants 
with welfare provisions, encouraging them to cling to their own cultures, 
and neglecting to ensure that they would adhere to the fundamentals of 
an open society. 
There are no consensual answers to these questions. Up to the late 
twentieth century, there was more anti-immigration rhetoric in parliament 
than effective policy to this end. Now this seems to have changed, with 
a remarkably broad consensus in parliament. There has indeed been an 
explosion of government spending on minorities, from some 9 million 
euros in 1980 to over 1.2 billion in 2003.28 But this spending was mainly 
on 'hard' sectors and certainly not on cultural and religious immigrant 
organizations. The 1970s idea of helping minorities to retain their own 
culture and language never became a central feature of minority policies, 
and had been abandoned altogether by the late 1980s. 
Much of the debate of the past decades has been obscured by the se-
mantic question of what is meant by a multicultural society. From the 
start, there was a descriptive use, very appropriate in times when pol-
iticians were unwilling to openly acknowledge the fact that the ethnic 
and cultural make-up of the country was changing. There is also a more 
normative reading, championing a broadening of the concept of national 
identity and hence rejecting the idea of assimilation or integration as basi-
cally one-sided processes. The more radical interpretations of the latter 
stance have been severely criticized in the past decade. But looking back 
over the entire post-war period, we may as well conclude that there never 
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was any serious political commitment to a radical version of multicultural-
ism. Integration has never ceased to be the norm. The only real issue has 
been the degree of toleration for 'non-Western' additions to a hegemonic 
Dutch Leitkultur. 
In reviewing recent debates on multiculturalism in the Netherlands, 
one is struck by the fact that postcolonial migrant communities hardly 
figure anymore - and when they do, it is mainly as evidence that massive 
immigration need not pose enduring problems. 29 This is partly explained 
by their better performance in the major statistics, but there are other con-
siderations. The present Dutch debates have a strong cultural dimension; 
'culture' often being but a thin disguise for 'Islam', and Islam perceived 
as a somehow unassimilable culture. This radical rejection is not main-
stream, but has certainly achieved wide popularity and respectability. 
In this context postcolonial migrant communities seem to have be-
come something of a shining example. One has a point here. In spite 
of ethnic 'otherness' and initial socioeconomic backlogs, the majority of 
postcolonial migrants were able to achieve successful integration - and 
their pre-migration 'colonial' cultural capital did help. Throughout the 
post-war period, postcolonial communities have articulated political and 
ideological resentment, as will be discussed below. But there was nothing 
like a rejection of Dutch society. The postcolonial migrant experience then 
becomes a showcase of migrants adjusting well in a presumably tolerant, 
non-racist host society. 
There are some problems with this approach. Partly these are of a cul-
tural nature, such as the glossing over of the fact that the ~ian' half of the 
Surinamese is neither from a Christian background, nor exogamous- pa-
rameters often quoted as crucial for successful integration. There is also a 
neglect of the uneasy class-cum-culture dimension to Mro-Caribbean inte-
gration problems, as in female-headed households, a hustlers' street culture, 
and the like. Nonetheless it seems that representatives of the postcolonial 
migrants do not fundamentally question the assertion that their communi-
ties are more capable and willing to fully integrate - and that their right to 
retain a distinct ethnic identity does not imperil this integration. 
Minority Associations, Cultural Heritage, 
History and Identity 
After the Second World War, over 2,500 associations of postcolonial mi-
grants were established in the Netherlands. They served pretty much the 
same objectives as the few dozen pre-war colonial ones: articulation of 
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ethnic cultures, religious services, providing a home away from home, and 
defence of group interests. The database recently inaugurated at the Inter-
national Institute of Social History in Amsterdam enables us to follow the 
life and times of postcolonial migrant organizations in unusual detail. 30 
In Terug uit de kolonien, Ulbe Bosma provides the first systematic analy-
sis of these associations. 31 He underlines that most associations were or-
ganized by the immigrants themselves: government policies and finance 
were crucial for a minority only. He does suggest that the striking un-
der-representation of Indische associations reflects a remarkable political 
opportunity structure. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the Dutch gov-
ernment discouraged the establishment of separate ethnic organizations, 
while at the same time the repatriates had easy access to the conservative 
political establishment anyway. The fact that Moluccans did create an as-
tonishing number of associations may indeed be taken as evidence of this 
group's long isolation from wider society, as well as its long engagement 
with the political issue of an independent Moluccas. 
The number of Surinamese organizations likewise is considerable. 
While initially most, and even at a later stage many, of these were founded 
as national, including all Surinamese, the ethnic plurality of the sending 
society was increasingly reflected in its postcolonial migrants. Something 
similar may be said about the less numerous assortment of Antillean orga-
nizations. While the majority of these would claim to be simply Antillean, 
most are predominantly Cura~aoan in character. 
As Bosma observes, over 2,500 may seem a lot, but the figure pales 
in comparison with the estimated 60,000 or so organizations extant in 
the Netherlands today. Also, the ratio of ethnic organizations to the scale 
of their community does not suggest a specific postcolonial propensity 
to found associations. The Antillean, Moroccan, Surinamese and Turkish 
ratios (in that order) are more or less in the same category. And all orga-
nizations suffer from the same problems of limited active membership, 
funding, and so on. 
Whether such ethnic associations are conducive to integration is a 
moot point, and experts offer contradictory interpretations. Suffice it here 
to observe that postcolonial organizations have been decisive in many 
instances in the articulation of political demands. All communities cam-
paigned for more generous state support for the new arrivals but there 
were also more specific demands. Thus, totoks and Indische Nederlanders 
jointly lobbied for back pay of salaries and pensions forgone because of 
the Japanese occupation, bersiap and the transfer of sovereignty, as well as 
a more generous entrance policy for repatriates. Moluccan associations 
sought to pressure the Dutch government to support the case for an inde-
pendent republic of the Moluccas. Surinamese societies urged the Dutch 
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government to isolate or even dethrone the military dictatorship of the 
1980s. And today, Antillean associations aim to ensure continuing, unre-
stricted entrance to the Netherlands. 
There were many more such lobbies. Some succeeded, others failed. 
But the point is that these political endeavours invariably included explicit 
reminders of the colonial past and the ensuing obligations of the Dutch 
government. Postcolonial migrant organizations had an evident asset here 
over other migrant associations. ('We are here because you were there.') 
Moreover, their leadership benefited from easier access to the authorities 
and media, not only because of such postcolonial reminders but equally 
because the colonial legacy had given them a distinct advantage in cultural 
capital. They had historical and political arguments, and the language and 
style to express these effectively. 
These bonuses allowed them to imply 'we have always been Dutch, 
certainly more so than other migrants'. But there was a concurrent and 
certainly not less pronounced affirmation of unique ethnic identity. Often 
one and the same organization would engage in both discursive strate-
gies, as indeed individuals did and do. Apart from the countless smaller 
ceremonies, parties, tournaments, and the like, over time a few massive 
cultural manifestations of postcolonial identity emerged. Thus we have 
the annual Indische Pasar Malam Besar in The Hague. It has celebrated its 
fiftieth anniversary and is the largest cultural festival in the city. The an-
nual Hindustani Milan festival also takes place there. Amsterdam hosts the 
annual Mro-Surinamese K wakoe festival, and Rotterdam has the annual 
summer carnival which started as an Antillean fiesta. 
All of these share postcolonial origins and continue to be bonding cel-
ebrations of ethnic affirmation, pride and perhaps nostalgia. Over the de-
cades, they have striven to widen their audience amongst the locals. Not 
all have been equally successful, but clearly there are no similarly inclusive 
festivals among the other migrant communities. Postcolonial migrant cul-
tures seem to have more of a propensity for building social bridges. But 
the very success of such festivals has prompted debates about authenticity. 
The issue is generally not whether bridging is acceptable or even desirable, 
but rather on what terms the 'authentic' culture is presented - not only 
in festivals, but equally in the media, in museum exhibitions, in artistic 
expressions, and the like. 
In her book Ons Indisch erfgoed, Lizzy van Leeuwen comments on these 
debates in the Indische community. 32 Her analysis of the endless po t-war 
contests over Indische authenticity graphically illustrates the pointles ness 
of essentialism, yet at the same time evokes the strong feeling within the 
community - if there is one at all - about identity, authenticity, and the 
right to define its contents. None of this becomes easier once the i ue of 
L 
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social bridging and the prospects of widening the audience crop up. From 
here it is only one more step to debates about the commoditization of 
identity and the cultural heritage industry. 
Such dilemmas are not unique to the Indische community and indeed 
are discussed in Caribbean circles as well. But again, something sets the 
combined postcolonial community apart here from other migrant groups, 
to wit, the predicament of defining a cultural identity of one's own while 
at the same time stressing the long-standing colonial and postcoloniallink-
ages. One way of reconciling these seemingly contradictory approaches is 
the return to history. 
Indeed, over the past two decades we have witnessed several postco-
lonial 'memory wars' - though 'wars' is too strong a word for very emo-
tional but strictly verbal contests. Over the past decades Dutch authorities 
facilitated the establishment of a series of monuments commemorating 
the war years in Indonesia. After much hesitation, in 1999 the govern-
ment marked 15 August, the day of the Japanese capitulation, as a na-
tional day of remembrance. Repatriates from Indonesia had led the way 
here, and urged for more. 33 Disenchanted with the way Loe de J ong, 
author of the monumental, state-commissioned history of the Kingdom 
during the Second World War, had depicted pre-war colonial society and 
particularly with regard to their role in it, a good number of totoks and 
Indische Nederlanders rose in protest in the late 1980s, paving the way 
for the initiation of a series of research projects on the history of Indische 
Nederlanders; the Japanese occupation and its aftermath; the supposedly 
cold-hearted post-war reception of the repatriates; and the handling of 
financial claims by the Dutch government. 34 
After protracted negotiations, this packet of historical studies led to a 
wider 'Gesture' ( Gebaar) in the 1990s, which consisted mainly of indi-
vidual compensation, but also financial support for a wide range of institu-
tions and initiatives having to do with Indische history and culture. Serious 
funding was also provided for the cultural institution 'Het Indisch Huis' 
(Indisch Home) which, as Lizzy van Leeuwen details, unfortunately ended 
up as an embarrassing failure. 35 With this broad fin de siecle programme, 
the Dutch government responded to the resentment in the Indische com-
munity and hoped to close the debate on the late colonial period and its 
aftermath. Predictably, this has turned out to be a premature hope. 
In the 1980s, as part of another package of reconciliatory policies, the 
Dutch government funded the establishment of a Moluccan historical 
museum in Utrecht. This was the first, and up to the present only, mu-
seum exclusively dedicated to a specific post-war immigrant community. 
Two decades later the government financed yet another historical research 
project, this time on sixty years ofMoluccan history in the Netherlands.36 
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Again, government had responded to the postcolonial urge to tell the 
story and hence broaden the national narrative. 
No such specific 'gestures' have been made for the entire Caribbean 
community. There is no museum or official history of migration from 
Suriname or the Antilles. But again in the late 1990s, the Dutch govern-
ment responded to the urge to address the most delicate element in this 
area of colonial history. In 2002 a national monument in commemoration 
of slavery was unveiled, with an educational and research institute added. 
In addition, a series of museum exhibitions and educational television 
programmes were sponsored. Reconciliation is an explicit objective, and 
once more there are hopes of closing this chapter. Meanwhile, of course, 
this leaves the Surinamese of Asian descent unattended on this carousel. 
At present it seems representatives of these groups take pride in not urging 
for such state-sponsored gestures. But this may change. 
In 2006, at the initiative of the Dutch parliament, an official commis-
sion presented a new canonical version of Dutch history. 37 Much has been 
said about the initiative itself and its results. But clearly the new canon re-
flects thorough changes in Dutch society and self-understanding, hence its 
critical attention to colonial history, including slavery, as well as post-war 
migrations. There is also an explicit awareness of multivocality and a ques-
tioning of assumptions about the relation between history and national 
identity. Certainly this is no longer the canon of a homogeneous white 
nation, and certainly the new profiles reflect debates in which postcolonial 
migrants have successfully staked their claims. 
At the same time, such initiatives beg for critical reflection. Thus one 
may well wonder about the correspondence between official canons and 
popular feeling, between historiography and memory. Moreover histori-
ans cannot ignore the perils of rewriting history to fit social objectives, 
even one as laudable as promoting integration. 
Identity Politics 
The concept of identity politics is widely used and perhaps misused in 
the study of minority groups. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 'The laden phrase "identity politics" has come to signify a wide 
range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experi-
ences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than orga-
nizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestoes, or party 
affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political 
freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context. 
Members of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding 
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their distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, 
with the goal of greater self-determination.'38 
There are some problems with this definition, the first being that the 
locus of identity politics is placed squarely with distinct, presumably mi-
nority, groups. One may well argue that any hegemonic discourse in any 
given state implies identity politics as well. There is no such thing as an 
undisputed national identity. Moreover, in democratic societies minori-
ties may claim the right of distinction without having to worry about the 
political freedom to do so. Finally, a discourse of 'distinctiveness' easily 
results in essentialism. With these caveats in mind we may nonetheless ask 
ourselves whether it is useful to speak of identity politics of the postcolo-
nial migrant communities in the Netherlands, and if so, to what end and 
with what results were these played out. 
In the early post-war decades, first totoks and then Indische Nederland-
ers did organize themselves to attain political goals. In some cases this 
was moderately successful, as in the prolongation of entrance rights for 
repatriates long after 1949 and perhaps also in urging for government-
supported housing. Other elements proved futile, as in the 1945-1949 
protest campaigns against the transfer of sovereignty. Joint claims for fi-
nancial compensation had only limited success. It seems, though, that in 
these first post-war decades, there was no appreciable political articulation 
of a separate identity within the Dutch imagined community. That had to 
wait until the later 1980s, and continues even to this day. 
From the start, cultural distinctiveness has been an issue in the Moluc-
can community, but again up to the 1980s, the objective of organizing 
and lobbying was mainly political: in particular the attempt to find sup-
port for their ideal of an independent republic of the Moluccas. It was a 
futile effort. Implicitly, the clinging to housing arrangements in separate 
locations singled out for Moluccans reflected a desire to sustain distinc-
tiveness. This striving was however undermined from within, as mem-
bers of the community were marrying and moving out anyway, and from 
without, as Dutch government policies actively and effectively discour-
aged separate housing arrangements. This policy did not change when, in 
recent times, there was more official recognition of the uniqueness of the 
Moluccan community and its migration history. 
One may debate whether there is a Surinamese identity in the first 
place, or rather a series of contrasting but remarkably easily coexisting 
ethnic identities. Perhaps one should add that whatever the results of na-
tion-building in Suriname itself, the 'community' in the Netherlands has 
demonstrated decreasing internal cohesion. Of course there has been joint 
lobbying throughout the past decades, mainly for political objectives. 
These include prolonging the right of abode and improving conditions 
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in the Netherlands, restoring democracy after the military coup, securing 
continuation of development aid and municipal cooperation, and so on. 
But precisely when it comes to identity issues, each ethnic group has gone 
its own way, with the Mro-Surinamese clearly being the most vocal in 
bringing cultural distinctiveness into the public debate. 
There is some irony in the fact that the latest arrivals, the Antilleans, 
stem from the only former colony still part of the Kingdom and yet have a 
leadership continually emphasizing cultural distinctiveness alongside his-
torical bonds. Again, the objectives have been mainly political: against 
the imposition of independence, against the Dutch wish to keep the six is-
lands together, against Dutch projects to curtail free entrance to the Neth-
erlands, in favour of more active policies to improve the socioeconomic 
situation of the community. The way cultural distinctiveness is used as 
an argumentative tool is ambiguous. There is much talk of pride in iden-
tity, of insular cultures that should be allowed to prosper, of the beauty 
of creolization and particularly Papiamentu. Yet in advocating vigorous 
and well-endowed integration policies, Antillean spokespeople invoke 
precisely elements of this cultural specificity - Papiamentu, matrifocality, 
sometimes 'slavery trauma' - as explanatory factors for the present crises 
in their community. 
If we narrow the concept of identity politics to cultural issues, we can 
easily see how postcolonial migrants have been instrumental in changing 
the parameters of the debate on multiculturalism. Even before coming 
to the Netherlands, the majority were culturally akin or at least well-ac-
quainted with Dutch culture, whether metropolitans acknowledged this 
or not. The right to undisputed citizenship was claimed with reference to 
a shared history and cultural affinity. Over the past decades, it is not so 
much a change in cultural orientation among the postcolonial migrants 
that catches the eye, but rather the gradual acknowledgement that Dutch 
culture today is more pluralistic than before. Leaders of the postcolonial 
migrant communities have been crucial to these reappraisals. There is no 
doubt their pre-migration cultural capital helped them to accomplish this. 
Conclusion 
The successive waves of postcolonial n1igrants were an unanticipated con-
sequence of the decolonization of the Dutch empire, with deep conse-
quences for the migrants and their children and for Dutch society at large. 
This contribution has painted a broad canvas of the colonial backgrounds 
of the various migrant communities, the context of their arrival in the 
Netherlands, the changing political opportunity structures, the processes 
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of socioeconomic integration and questions of identity. Clearly there is no 
such thing as one homogeneous, postcolonial migrant community in the 
Netherlands, and one wonders whether 'postcolonial' is much more than 
just a descriptive adjective. 
Certainly the separate, and increasingly less cohesive ethnic 'communi-
ties' discussed here have not always thought of themselves as homoge-
neous and like-minded. Much less have they promoted the concept of 
a 'postcolonial migrant community' as an encompassing denominator. 
There has been little practice of postcolonial identification and no tradi-
tion of postcolonial theory. There are noteworthy contrasts here with the 
French and particularly the British experiences. There are more dissimilar-
ities, which need further reflection, particularly the little overlap between 
the Muslim and postcolonial migrant communities in the Netherlands 
- and in Portugal - as compared with France and the United Kingdom. 
As for the Dutch debates on the place of colonialism and its excesses in 
the larger narrative of the nation, there seems to be more of a convergence 
here between the British, French and Dutch cases, whereas the two Ibe-
rian countries seem to lag behind- possibly because there is no immediate 
postcolonial migrant community in Spain, while for this community in 
Portugal colonialism is not a critical issue. The wider question here has to 
do with national sensibilities and responsiveness to identity politics. For 
comparative purposes, one may also look at the cases of lesser colonial 
powers such as Germany and Italy. Indeed we may also begin to include 
other postcolonial migration experiences in the equation, such as Turkey, 
Russia or Japan - but it will take far more comparative research before we 
can sort out whether this widening of focus really helps us understand the 
phenomenon of postcolonial migrations any better. 
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